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Summary 
Approaching three years into the recovery from the 2007-2009 recession, the unemployment rate 
remains over 8%. The persistent difficulty of many of the workers who lost jobs to find 
reemployment has meant reduced incomes for them and their families. An historically slow 
rebound in the labor market appears to be partly responsible for some groups’ focus on the 
distribution of the benefits of economic growth and for some policymakers’ interest in 
redistributing income through the tax code, for example. Varying perceptions about a trade-off 
between economic growth and income equality appear to underlie longstanding congressional 
deliberations about such policy issues as the progressivity of income tax rates, the tax treatment 
of capital gains, and the adjustment of the federal minimum wage. 
If income were equally divided across households, each quintile (fifth) would account for 20% of 
total income. The Congressional Budget Office and others have documented that the bottom fifth 
has long accounted for much less than 20% of total income. The bottom quintile’s share of 
income has remained little changed for the past few decades at less than 4%, according to Census 
Bureau data. In contrast, the income shares of the top fifth and the top 5% of households appear 
to have trended upward. The top fifth’s share of total household income rose from 42.6% in 1968 
to 50.2% in 2010; the top 5%’s share, from 16.3% to 21.3%. (Estimates derived from federal 
income tax data suggest that those at the very top of the income distribution have experienced 
greater gains.) The middle class, defined as the middle 60%, received a disproportionately smaller 
share of the total economic pie in 2010 (46.5%) than in 1968 (53.2%). 
Two explanations are most often offered for the changes in recent decades in the U.S. distribution 
of income. They are skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and globalization. Additional 
support for education and training is a frequently cited policy measure to both improve U.S. 
competitiveness in the international marketplace and raise the relative incomes of low- and 
middle-skill workers as well as the incomes of their children when they enter the labor force. 
Based on the limited data that are comparable across nations, the U.S. income distribution 
appears to be among the most uneven of all major industrialized countries and the United States 
appears to be among the nations experiencing the greatest increases in measures of inequality. 
Three leading explanations are put forth for these cross-country differences: (1) other advanced 
economies devote a larger share of national output to transfers, which tends to equalize income 
across households; (2) the progressivity of tax rates varies by country and thus has different 
effects on the distribution of after-tax income; and (3) equality in the distribution of earnings, 
which account for most household income, varies substantially across countries. 
The extent to which countries undertake policies that affect their income distributions may reflect 
national differences in perceptions about the degree of income mobility. In the United States, a 
longstanding argument against redistributionary measures has been that each person has an equal 
opportunity to move up the income ladder. Research raises questions about whether Americans’ 
reported perceptions about their likelihood of changing position in the income distribution are 
exaggerated. 
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Introduction 
The unemployment rate averaged 8.9% in 2011 and remains above 8.0% thus far in 2012, over 
three percentage points higher than its level at the outset of the December 2007-June 2009 
recession. The inability of many of the workers who lost jobs during the recession to find new 
ones during the recovery has meant reduced income for them and their families.1 The slow pace 
of recovery in the labor market has renewed interest in the long-term trend of growing inequality 
in the distribution of income.2 In other words, the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher 
incomes) began accruing unequally across U.S. households long before the late 2000s. 
Economic theory provides little basis for preferring any particular degree of equality in the 
distribution of income. In theory, what matters with respect to labor income is that the distribution 
results from markets that operate efficiently; that is, markets in which the final demand for goods 
and services and the relative productivity of the firms producing those goods and services 
determine the demand for labor and the earnings of jobs in each sector of the economy. 
Theoretical arguments for a more equal distribution of income than that which results from 
market forces are based on a number of propositions, including the diminishing marginal utility 
of income. This refers to the idea that each additional dollar of income yields less and less 
satisfaction (utility) than the first. For example, one additional dollar of income adds less to the 
utility of someone earning $100,000 than to the satisfaction of someone earning $20,000. If this 
proposition is correct, it should be possible to increase the overall well-being of society by 
transferring money from those with high incomes to those with low incomes because the loss in 
utility will be less for high-income individuals than the gain for low-income individuals. 
However, the costs commonly associated with income redistribution (e.g., slower economic 
growth) may offset some and possibly all of any net gain in well-being.3 
With varying perceptions about a trade-off between economic growth and income equality, 
members of the U.S. public policy community have long debated how best to improve the well-
being of the population. This disagreement appears to underlie longstanding congressional 
deliberations about several policy issues, such as the progressivity of income tax rates, tax 
treatment of capital gains and inheritance, provision of social insurance (e.g., Social Security) as 
well as social welfare benefits (e.g., food stamps), and raising the federal minimum wage.4 It also 
has extended to consideration of initiatives (e.g., grants for early childhood education and college 
tuition tax expenditures) that arguably promote equality in the opportunity to move up the income 
ladder,5 which an increasingly unequal distribution of income may suggest a lack of and which 
may itself curb the potential productive capacity of the economy.6 
                                                 
1 The December 2007-June 2009 recession was the eleventh recession of the postwar period. The labor market 
following the latest recession has been recovering more slowly than it did after most of the ten prior recessions. For 
more information see CRS Report R41434, Job Growth During the Recovery, by Linda Levine. 
2 D.B. Grusky and C. Wimer, “Is There Too Much Inequality?,” in The Inequality Puzzle: European and US Leaders 
Discuss Rising Income Inequality, ed. Roland Berger, David Grusky, Tobias Raffel, Geoffrey Samuels, and Christopher 
Wimer (Germany: Springer, 2010), pp. 4-5. 
3 For additional information see “Reducing Income Inequality While Boosting Economic Growth: Can It Be Done?” 
(part II, chapter 5 of Economic Policy Reforms, Going for Growth 2012, February 2012, 200 pp.), in which the OECD 
identifies the impact of various policies on both growth and equality. 
4 During the 112th Congress, see for example H.R. 283 (the Living Wage Act of 2011), H.R. 382 (the Income Equity 
Act of 2011), S. 1960 (the Job Creation Act), and S. 2059 (Paying a Fair Share Act of 2012). 
5 During the 112th Congress, see for example H.R. 953 (Making College Affordable Act of 2011), H.R. 4038 (the 
(continued...) 
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This report presents recent analysis of the distribution of income and the extent of income 
mobility in the United States over time and in comparison with other advanced economies. It 
begins with a discussion of data issues related to measuring income and its distribution. The 
empirical literature on the development of and explanations for income inequality in the United 
States are next addressed. The report then compares the U.S. income distribution with the 
distributions of other industrialized countries and presents explanations for cross-country 
differences in equality measures. To the degree that a more equal distribution of income arises 
from policy decisions rather than market forces, the willingness of a country to incur any 
economic costs related to attaining greater equality may reflect varying national beliefs about the 
opportunity to ascend the income ladder. For that reason, the report closes with an examination of 
income mobility in the United States and other developed nations. 
Measures of Income 
Two common sources of income data are the Annual Social and Economic supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and federal income tax returns submitted to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The Census Bureau, which conducts the CPS, calculates “money 
income.” It is the nation’s official measure of income. Money income includes wages and 
salaries, interest, dividends, rent, payments from pensions and retirement savings accounts, and 
nonmeans-tested cash income (e.g., Social Security, unemployment compensation, and veterans’ 
payments). Calculated on a pre-tax basis, money income does not include the value of noncash 
government benefits (e.g., food stamps and housing subsidies) and capital gains.7 
“Market income” is the measure of income derived from federal tax data made available by the 
IRS. Perhaps most prominent among the researchers who use tax data to study the distribution of 
income are Saez and Piketty. They define pre-tax market income to include all income reported 
on individual tax returns including wages and salaries, business and farm income, and capital 
income (e.g., dividends, interest, and rents).8 The primary differences between money and market 
income thus defined is that market income excludes cash government benefits and includes 
realized capital gains. 
With respect to the distribution of overall economic well-being, measures based on the concepts 
of money and market income fall short and may be misleading. Consider the case of two families 
who in every way are equal in terms of wealth and income. Neither owns their home, and they 
both have substantial savings in interest-earning assets. Suppose one family uses a portion of its 
savings to buy a home. No one would argue that the family is now worse off, but income 
measures indicate that to be the case because the family’s interest income would have fallen. In 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
American College Tuition Tax Relief Act of 2012), S. 1495 (the Early Intervention for Graduation Success Act of 
2011), and S. 1978 (the Community College Innovation Act). 
6 See for example Florence Jaumotte, Subir Lall, and Chris Papageorgiou, Rising Income Inequality: Technology, or 
Trade and Financial Globalization, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 08/185, July 1, 2008. 
7 The Census Bureau also periodically calculates alternative measures of income that include such income sources as 
government noncash benefits and capital gains. The latest alternative measures of income are available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/rdcall/1_001.htm. 
8 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 118, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1-39. (Hereinafter referred to as Piketty and Saez, Income Inequality in the 
United States, 1913-1998.) 
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fact, the family that buys its home is earning an implicit income in the use of the house just as it 
would earn rental income if the house were leased to others. Not counting this implicit income 
may have a significant effect on the distribution of income. 
Another weakness in existing income measures as a reflection of overall economic well-being is 
that they do not account for the implicit income of homemakers. Consider two married-couple 
households with the same income and both spouses receive wages from their employers. If in one 
of the households a spouse quits to stay at home and care for their children that household will 
experience a drop in measured income. Because the unpaid work done at home is not without 
value, the measured difference in the incomes of the two households will overstate the difference 
in their living standards. 
The time period in which income is measured may also affect comparisons in well-being across 
households. Over the course of the business cycle unemployment rises and falls, affecting labor 
income. Some households tend to be more adversely affected than others by recessions, so the 
stage of the business cycle has an influence on relative income. Similarly, income generally varies 
substantially over the course of an individual’s lifetime. New entrants to the labor force typically 
have lower incomes than those who have been working for some time, and income tends to 
decrease upon retirement. Because of these life-cycle changes in income, the age mix of the 
population also influences the relative incomes of households. 
Another difficulty in comparing income across households is deciding on the relevant population. 
In the case of labor income, the distribution of income among working-age individuals (e.g., 25-
64 year olds) may be of most interest. When it comes to overall well-being, it may be more 
appropriate to consider the distribution of income across households. Because most households 
can be presumed to pool resources and because some costs of living are fixed, a four-person 
household may not need twice as much income as a married-couple household for each person to 
enjoy roughly the same living standard.9 The ability to achieve economies of scale thus further 
complicates using the distribution of income across households or tax filing units as a basis for 
judging economic well-being.10 
Measures of the Distribution of Income 
The Census Bureau annually publishes a variety of measures that describe the distribution of 
money income. One measure divides total money income into quintiles (fifths), with households 
ordered from lowest to highest income and then divided into five groups of equal size. The 
income within each group is summed, and its share (percentage) of total household income is 
calculated. If aggregate income was equally divided across households with income, each quintile 
would account for 20% of total money income. To the extent that each quintile falls short of or 
exceeds its proportionate (20%) share, it indicates the degree of inequality in the income 
distribution. 
                                                 
9 In the Current Population Survey (CPS), a household is defined as all of the individuals who occupy a housing unit as 
their usual place of residence. A family is defined as a group of two or more individuals who reside together and who 
are related by birth, marriage, or adoption. A household may be composed of one or more families or no families at all; 
that is, a person living alone in a housing unit is counted as a household in the CPS. 
10 A tax unit is anyone who files a federal income tax return. 
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As shown in the last row of Table 1, the bottom fifth of households in 2010 accounted for much 
less than the one-fifth of total income it would have gotten if the distribution were perfectly 
equal. The top 20%, in contrast, accounted for more than twice what it would have gotten in an 
equal distribution. The top 5%, which is within the top fifth, accounted for more than four times 
the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution. The data thus indicate that income 
was quite unequally distributed across U.S. households in 2010. 
Table 1. Distribution of U.S. Household Income by Quintile, Selected Years 
(1968-2010) 
Percentage of Total Household Income  
Year Bottom Second Third Fourth Fifth Top 5% 
1968 4.2 11.1 17.6 24.5 42.6 16.3 
1980 4.2 10.2 16.8 24.7 44.1 16.5 
1990 3.8 9.6 15.9 24.0 46.6 18.5 
2000 3.6 8.9 14.8 23.0 49.8 22.1 
2001 3.5 8.7 14.6 23.0 50.1 22.4 
2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 21.7 
2003 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.8 21.4 
2004 3.4 8.7 14.7 23.2 50.1 21.8 
2005 3.4 8.6 14.6 23.0 50.4 22.2 
2006 3.4 8.6 14.5 22.9 50.5 22.3 
2007 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 21.2 
2008 3.4 8.6 14.7 23.3 50.0 21.5 
2009 3.4 8.6 14.6 23.2 50.3 21.7 
2010 3.3 8.5 14.6 23.4 50.2 21.3 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Social and Economic Supplements to the Current Population Survey.  
Households at various points in the distribution also have fared differently from each other over 
time. Between 1968 and 2010, the income share of the three middle quintiles fell from 53.2% to 
46.5% (see Table 1). Although there is no official definition of the middle class, the middle 60% 
of households is sometimes regarded as such.11 As for the bottom 20% of households, its income 
share has stagnated at less than 4.0% for the last few decades. In contrast, the income shares of 
the top fifth and the top 5% of households generally have risen from year to year. The top 20%’s 
share grew from 42.6% in 1968 to 50.2% in 2010, and the top 5%’s share grew from 16.3% to 
21.3%.  
Another indicator of the degree of inequality is the Gini coefficient. It is a single number that can 
range between zero (a perfectly equal distribution) and one (a perfectly unequal distribution).12 
                                                 
11 CRS Report RS20811, The Distribution of Household Income and the Middle Class, by Linda Levine. 
12 For additional information on the Gini coefficient see Malte Luebker, Inequality, Income Shares and Poverty: the 
Practical Meaning of Gini Coefficients, International Labour Office, Travail Policy Brief No. 3, Geneva, Switzerland, 
June 2010, 8 pp. 
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The historical trend in the United States is one of almost steadily increasing income inequality 
(from 0.386 in 1968 to 0.469 in 2010), as depicted in Figure 1. During the 2007-2009 recession, 
the Gini coefficient fell slightly from its 2006 peak. Nonetheless, its level in 2010 indicates an 
income distribution that is much more unequal than in most years since 1968. 
Figure 1. Gini Coefficients for U.S. Households, 1968-2010 
 
Source: Created by CRS from data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplements to 
the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Note: The increase in the Gini coefficient in the early 1990s was due to the redesign of the CPS. 
Researchers who work with the CPS data often calculate an alternative measure of overall 
inequality (the ratio of income at the 90th percentile in the distribution to income at the 10th 
percentile) because the Gini coefficient does not allow them to ascertain which parts of the 
income distribution are driving changes in inequality. An increase in the ratio of the median 
income level (50th percentile) to the 10th percentile income level (the 50-10 ratio) suggests that 
growth in overall inequality (the 90-10 ratio) is due to those near the bottom of the distribution 
falling further behind the typical household. An increase in the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 
median income level (the 90-50 ratio) suggests that growth in overall inequality is due to those 
near the top of the distribution pulling further ahead of the typical household. Based on these 
measures, increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution may have accounted for most 
of the overall increase in inequality between 1961 and 2002.13 Looking at just the 1990-2002 
period, almost all of the increase in overall inequality appears to be due to an increase in top-half 
                                                 
13 Kevin A. Bryan and Leonardo Martinez, “On the Evolution of Income Inequality in the United States,” Economic 
Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, spring 2008. 
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inequality. This pattern of the benefits of economic growth accruing largely to those near the top 
of the income distribution was estimated to have continued through 2007.14 
The 90-10 ratio may be a poor substitute for estimating overall inequality at a point in time and 
over time because it is affected by top-coding in the CPS. Top-coding refers to the Census 
Bureau’s long-standing practice of replacing the income reported above a specific level with that 
income level to ensure confidentiality. For example, if the total money income of a household 
was $780,000 in 2010, the household’s income would have been coded as $250,000 because 
$250,000 was the threshold income level in that year. Top-coding therefore presents a problem 
when estimating the extent of inequality in a given year because it constrains the actual 
distribution of income. The practice also creates a problem when estimating changes in inequality 
over time because the top-code thresholds were raised at various times over the years and as a 
result, the share of households with suppressed incomes has differed over time.15 
These drawbacks to using CPS data, in combination with anecdotal evidence that since the 1990s 
those in the top 10% have pulled further away from other households, prompted economists to 
turn to other data sources that better capture those with high incomes. Piketty and Saez developed 
a time series from the early years of the 20th century forward based primarily on federal income 
tax returns to study changes in market income among tax units at the very top of the income 
distribution.16 They estimated that between 40% and 45% of total income accrued to the top 10% 
of the distribution between the two World Wars before falling to about 30% during World War II. 
The top decile’s share remained at 31%-32% until the 1970s when it began trending upward. The 
top decile’s share again exceeded 40% by the mid-1990s and has been at all-time highs in recent 
years. In 2010, the latest year for which an estimate is available, the top 10% accounted for over 
46% of aggregate market income.17 
Piketty and Saez attribute most of the changes in the top decile’s share over time to fluctuations in 
the top 1% of the distribution. They estimated that before World War I the top 1% accounted for 
about 18% of total market income. Its share peaked at almost 24% in the late 1920s, fell to about 
8% from the late 1950s to the 1970s, and then turned upward.18 The top 1% was estimated to 
have accounted for over 17% of total market income in 2010, about equal to its pre-World War I 
share.19 
Like the CPS, tax returns have limitations for analyzing income inequality (e.g., time-shifting 
income through use of deferred compensation, such as stock options, and reporting income as 
                                                 
14 Javier Diaz-Gimenez, Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, and Andy Glover, “Facts on the Distributions of Earnings, Income, and 
Wealth in the United States: 2007 Update,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 34, no. 1 
(February 2011), pp. 2-31. (Hereinafter referred to as Diaz-Gimenez et al, Facts on the Distribution of Earnings, 
Income, and Wealth.) 
15 Richard V. Burkhauser, Shuaizhang Feng, and Stephen P. Jenkins, “Using the P90/P10 Ratio to Measure US 
Inequality Trends with Current Population Survey Data: A View from Inside the Census Bureau Vaults,” Review of 
Income and Wealth, vol. 55, no. 1 (2009), pp. 166-185. 
16 They define tax units to be married-couples living together or single adults with or without dependents in Piketty and 
Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998. 
17 Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top Income Database, 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/. (Hereinafter referred to as Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and 
Saez, http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/.) 
18 Piketty and Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998. 
19 Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/. 
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earnings or business profits depending on their tax treatment in a given year). Burkhauser, Feng, 
Jenkins et al. attempted to reconcile the smaller increases in money income inequality starting in 
the 1990s that are estimated by studies based on public-use CPS data with the larger increases in 
market income inequality of studies based on tax data. Using internal Census Bureau data (which 
is less subject to top-coding than is public-use data) to estimate income shares of those in the 90th-
95th percentile, the 95th-99th percentile, and the top 1%, they found that inequality trends during 
most of the 1967-2006 period were quite similar to those of studies that used tax data once 
comparable definitions of income and income-receiving units were employed.20 
Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon more recently estimated that if after-tax, after-transfer income 
adjusted for household size is analyzed rather than before-tax, before-transfer income of tax units 
income inequality in the United States increased [between 1979 and 2007] not because the 
rich got richer, the poor got poorer and the middle class stagnated, but because the rich got 
richer at a faster rate than the middle and poorer quintiles and this mainly occurred in the 
1980s. [Income] growth was substantial in all quintiles once the influence of government tax 
and transfer policy as well as the shift in compensation from wages to health insurance 
provided by employers and the shift to increased in-kind health insurance by government is 
more fully recognized.21 
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report also examined after-tax, after-transfer size-adjusted 
household income over the 1979-2007 period. It too estimated that absolute levels of inflation-
adjusted average household income increased across the distribution, but because the rate of 
increase was much greater among the highest income households, inequality increased after 1979. 
For example, the top 1% of households saw their average real income rise by 275% from 1979 to 
2007; the middle three quintiles experienced a 37% increase; and the bottom fifth recorded an 
18% gain. Consequently, in 2007, the share of income after taxes and transfers of the top 20% of 
size-adjusted households was greater than the combined share of the other 80% of households 
(58% and 47%, respectively).22 
Explaining Recent Trends in the Distribution of U.S. 
Household Income 
Two explanations are most commonly offered for the trend toward greater inequality in the 
distribution of labor income in the United States.23 One has to do with globalization, that is, the 
increased integration of countries’ economies. The second relates to the nature of recent 
technological advances. 
                                                 
20 Richard V. Burkhauser, Shuaizhang Feng, and Stephen P. Jenkins, et al., Recent Trends in Top Income Shares in the 
USA: Reconciling Estimates from the March CPS and IRS Tax Return Data, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 15320, Cambridge, MA, September 2009. 
21 Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff Larrimore, and Kosali I. Simon, A “Second Opinion” on the Economic Health of the 
American Middle Class, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17164, Cambridge, MA, June 2011, 
p. 21. 
22 Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007, Washington, 
DC, October 2011. 
23 Labor income is the leading contributor to household income. In 2007, according to the latest Survey of Consumer 
Finances sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board, earnings accounted for 64% of household income. 
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Reduced trade restrictions and increased worldwide flows of goods and services have arguably 
made less skilled U.S. workers in particular more vulnerable to direct competition from less 
skilled workers abroad. In theory, the shift overseas in production of goods and services that 
predominantly use less-skilled workers has reduced demand in the United States for these 
workers, thereby putting downward pressure on their wages and further widening the existing 
wage gap between lower and higher skilled U.S. workers. 
Economists generally have not agreed about globalization being a major contributor to increasing 
income inequality because little compelling empirical evidence supports the theory. Analyses of 
globalization’s employment effect to date have tended to find it too small to explain the 
magnitude of the earnings gap.24 Other studies have estimated that a large number of jobs possess 
characteristics which make them susceptible to being offshored.25 As it is technological advances 
(e.g., high-speed telecommunication) that have made these jobs (e.g., call center workers) 
vulnerable to offshore outsourcing, some have suggested that globalization cannot be separated 
from the technological change argument (discussed below).26 
Economists generally have found technological change to be the most persuasive explanation for 
increased inequality at the top of the earnings distribution.27 Frequently cited evidence underlying 
this explanation is the comparatively rapid growth in the wage premium paid to more highly 
skilled (productive) workers since 1979. For example, the wage gap between workers with a 
bachelor’s degrees and workers with a high school education almost doubled between the 1980s 
and the 2000s.28 The increase in the skill premium coincided with substantial growth in the 
percentage of the labor force with a college education. This suggests that the growth in their 
supply did not keep pace with the increase in employer demand for highly skilled workers.29 
The increased premium paid to high-skilled workers is commonly ascribed to the nature of 
technological change in recent decades. Put another way, the kinds of technological advances that 
have occurred since the late 1970s have been biased in favor of those jobs that require higher 
levels of education and training. Technological progress seemingly has affected the earnings 
distribution in two ways. First, information technology (IT) serves as a substitute for low-skilled 
workers, which has reduced demand for and the relative wages of these workers. Second, IT 
serves as a complement to high-skilled workers, which has raised demand for and the relative 
wages of these workers.30 Autor, Katz, and Kearney have refined this explanation. They 
hypothesize that computerization of tasks has polarized the labor market by 
• increasing employer demand for those high-skilled workers who perform non-
routine cognitive tasks (e.g., engineers and lawyers); 
                                                 
24 A summary of these studies appears in CRS Report RL32292, Offshoring (or Offshore Outsourcing) and Job Loss 
Among U.S. Workers, by Linda Levine. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Richard B. Freeman, “Globalization and Inequality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, ed. Wiemer 
Salverda, Brian Nolan, and Timothy M. Smeeding (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 575-598. 
27 See for example Ben S. Bernanke, Speech at Harvard University, June 4, 2008. 
28 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Social and Economic Supplements to the Current Population Survey. 
29 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology: the Evolution of U.S. 
Educational Wage Differentials, 1890 to 2005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12984, 
Cambridge, MA, March 2007. 
30 David Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane, “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical 
Exploration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 5, November 2003, pp. 1279-1333. 
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• keeping demand stable for those low-skilled workers who perform non-routine 
manual tasks (e.g., truck drivers and home health care aides); and 
• decreasing demand for the many medium-skilled workers who perform routine 
tasks (e.g., administrative support and factory workers). 
They estimated that this pattern of job growth has produced substantial earnings gains among 
workers in the top quartile (25%) of the distribution. Workers in the bottom quartile were found to 
have experienced slower gains than workers in the top quartile. Nonetheless, wage growth of the 
bottom quartile appears to have exceeded that of workers in the middle of the earnings 
distribution.31 
Two less often mentioned explanations for the increase in U.S. income inequality are the 
declining role of labor unions and labor standards in wage-setting and the changing demographics 
of the population. Some analysts have offered evidence of inconsistencies in the data that do not 
support the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) explanation32 and have argued that changes 
over time in economic institutions and social norms have played a part as well (e.g., the value of 
the federal minimum wage, the progressivity of income tax rates, and the bargaining power of 
labor unions).33 Others have examined changes over time in the U.S. age structure, racial and 
ethnic composition, and household living arrangements (e.g., away from married-couple families 
and toward single adult households).34 
International Comparisons of Income Distributions 
Cross-country comparisons of income distributions provide another perspective on the extent of 
inequality in the United States. Measures of income differ from one country to the next. For this 
reason, researchers typically use data made more comparable by the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) project or by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).35 
Researchers who analyzed LIS data from the mid-1970s to 2000 agree that the comparatively 
high level of inequality in the United States has been in place for quite some time and that the 
United States was among those countries that experienced the largest increases in inequality over 
the 25-year period.36 They found the most equal distributions of disposable household income 
                                                 
31 David H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, “Trends in Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 90, no. 2 (May 2008), pp. 300-323. 
32 David Card and John E. DiNardo, “Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems 
and Puzzles,” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 20 (October 2002), pp. 733-783. 
33 Frank Levy and Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper 13106, Cambridge, MA, May 2007. 
34 Gary Burtless, “Demographic Transformation and Economic Inequaltiy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Inequality, ed. Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan, and Timothy M. Smeeding (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 
435-454. 
35 The LIS and OECD use as their common measure disposable household money income. Disposable household 
income starts with market income, which includes earned income from wages, salaries, and self-employment as well as 
other cash income from private sources (e.g., property, private pensions, and child support). Public transfer payments 
(e.g., for old-age, sickness and disability, maternity and family support, unemployment, housing, and food) are added to 
market income. From this estimate of gross income, personal income tax and workers’ social security contributions are 
subtracted to arrive at disposable cash income. This after-tax after-transfer income is then adjusted for household size. 
36 Anthony B. Atkinson, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Distribution in OECD Countries: 
(continued...) 
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over the lengthy period were in Scandinavia, Central Europe and Southern Europe, while most 
English-speaking countries consistently had the highest levels of inequality. Between the mid-
1970s and 2000, Sweden, Finland and Norway appear to have experienced the smallest increases 
in inequality while the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy seemingly experienced the 
largest increases. The United States also was estimated to have had the most persistent increase in 
inequality from the mid-1970s to 2000. In contrast, the researchers found that the rate at which 
inequality increased in other industrialized nations generally slowed in the later years of the 
period. 
LIS income distribution measures for the mid-2000s for several industrialized nations are 
presented in Table 2.The countries are listed in order from lowest Gini coefficient (most equal 
distribution) to highest (most unequal distribution). According to this measure, the United States 
ranked among the industrialized countries with the most unequal distributions of disposable 
(after-tax after cash transfers) household income in the mid-2000s. The comparatively high 
degree of income inequality in the United States is evident from the 90-10 and 90-50 ratios as 
well. As indicated by the 90-10 ratio, those at the top of the U.S. income distribution had more 
than five times the income of those near the bottom. Those at the top of the U.S. distribution also 
had about twice the income of the typical household, as indicated by the 90-50 ratio. 
Table 2. Summary Measures of Disposable Household Income Distributions for 
Selected Countries in the Mid-2000s 
Country Year Gini Coefficient P90 /P10 P90 /P50 
Denmark 2004 0.228 2.778 1.562 
Slovenia 2004 0.231 2.920 1.650 
Sweden 2005 0.237 2.821 1.625 
Finland 2004 0.256 3.071 1.708 
Norway 2004 0.256 2.865 1.604 
Netherlands 2004 0.266 3.018 1.737 
Austria 2004 0.269 3.232 1.787 
Germany 2004 0.278 3.445 1.823 
France 2005 0.280 3.528 1.842 
Australia 2003 0.312 4.241 1.983 
Poland 2004 0.315 4.022 1.959 
Canada 2004 0.318 4.379 1.957 
Greece 2004 0.327 4.374 2.027 
Italy 2004 0.340 4.440 2.029 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Evidence From the Luxembourg Income Study, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995; 
Timothy Smeeding, Changing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Updated Results from the Luxembourg Income 
Study, Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper 252, March 2000; Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy and 
Economic Inequality: The United States in Comparative Perspective, Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper 367, 
February 2004; and Andrea Brandolini and Timothy M. Smeeding, “Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western 
Democracies: Some Facts on Levels and Trends,” Political Science and Politics, vol. 39, no. 1 (2006), pp. 21-26. 
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Country Year Gini Coefficient P90 /P10 P90 /P50 
United Kingdom 2004 0.344 4.411 2.137 
United States 2004 0.370 5.506 2.126 
Mexico 2004 0.457 8.468 2.945 
Colombia 2004 0.506 11.254 3.334 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, Inequality Key Figures, downloaded on 12/23/2011 from http://www.lisdata 
center.org. 
Note: Disposable household income is market income (e.g., earnings, self-employment income, pensions, rent, 
and dividends) plus public transfer payments (e.g., old-age and unemployment insurance, maternity and family 
support) less personal income tax payments and workers’ social security contributions, adjusted for size of 
household. 
With virtually no change between the mid and late 2000s in the ranking of countries by extent of 
inequality in disposable household income, the United States was again among the nations with 
the most unequal distributions (see Gini coefficients in Table 2 and Table 3).37 U.S. income 
inequality in the late 2000s surpassed the average for the 20 founding member countries of the 
OECD (see Table 3). 
Disposable household income inequality in the developed countries of the OECD, including those 
listed in Table 3, has generally trended upward since the mid-1980s.38 While inequality in the 
United States increased by slightly more than the OECD20 average during the mid-1980s to mid-
1990s period, the increase in U.S. inequality was considerably greater relative to the OECD 
average from the mid-1990s to late 2000s (see the last columns of Table 3). Changes in U.S. tax 
policy initiated in the early 2000s, which have reduced the taxes paid by higher income tax filers 
to a greater extent than lower income tax filers, may help to explain the above-average increase in 
income inequality in the United States in recent years.39 
Table 3. Summary Measure of Disposable Household Income Distributions for 
Selected Countries in the Late 2000s and Change from Mid-1980s to Late 2000s 
  Percentile Point Change 
Country Gini Coefficienta Mid-1980s to Mid-1990s Mid-1990s to Late 2000s 
Slovenia 0.236 n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 0.248 -0.6 3.3 
Norway 0.25 2.1 0.7 
Finland 0.259 2.1 3.2 
Sweden 0.259 1.4 4.8 
Austria 0.261 n.a. 2.7 
                                                 
37 As much as data availability allow, the countries presented in Table 3 are the same as those in Table 2. Differences 
tend to be very small between Gini coefficients by country for comparable time periods estimated from either the 
OECD or LIS databases. 
38 OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, December 2011, 388 pp. 
39 CRS Report R42131, Changes in the Distribution of Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of 
Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy, by Thomas L. Hungerford. 
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  Percentile Point Change 
Country Gini Coefficienta Mid-1980s to Mid-1990s Mid-1990s to Late 2000s 
France 0.293 -2.3 1.6 
Netherlands 0.294 2.5 -0.3 
Germany 0.295 1.5 3.0 
Poland 0.305 n.a. n.a. 
Greece 0.307 0.0 -2.8 
Canada 0.324 -0.4 3.5 
Australia 0.336 n.a. 2.7 
Italy 0.337 3.9 -1.1 
United Kingdom 0.345 2.7 0.9 
United States 0.378 2.3 1.8 
Mexico 0.476 6.6 -4.3 
Chile 0.494 n.a. -3.3 
OECD20b 0.316 2.1 0.5 
Source: OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, December 5, 2011, p. 45. 
Note: Disposable household income is market income (e.g., earnings, self-employment income, pensions, rent, 
and dividends) plus public transfer payments (e.g., old-age and unemployment insurance, maternity and family 
support) less personal income tax payments and workers’ social security contributions, adjusted for size of 
household. n.a.=not available. 
a.  The Gini coefficients are for 2008, except for Chile (2009) and Denmark (2007). 
b. The OECD20 are the founding countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Explaining Cross-Country Differences in the 
Distribution of Income 
Commonly offered reasons for international differences in income inequality fall into three 
categories. First, many other countries devote a much larger share of their national output (gross 
domestic product, GDP) to income transfers, which have an equalizing effect on the distribution 
of income. Second, tax rates in these countries vary with respect to progressivity, and thus have 
different effects on the distribution of after-tax income. Third, equality in the distribution of 
earnings, which make up the majority of household income, varies substantially from one country 
to another. 
Smeeding estimated a strong correlation between the income share of those at the low end of the 
distribution and the share of GDP accounted for by transfer payments. His analysis suggests that 
given the amount of money transferred to households in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, those at the low end of their respective income distributions do not benefit as much 
from transfers as low-income households in other countries. From this Smeeding concluded that 
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transfer payments are not as well targeted at low-income households in the United States as they 
are in many other nations.40 
The OECD estimated that public cash transfers and household taxes (i.e., income tax payments 
and social security contributions) substantially reduce inequality between market income and 
disposable income. These government policies were found to have lowered income inequality by 
one-fourth on average in the mid-2000s. The redistributive effect of public cash transfers and 
household taxes was smaller than average in the United States. While transfer payments were 
found to have reduced inequality by twice as much as taxes on average in OECD countries, the 
opposite was true in the United States; that is, income tax payments and social security 
contributions were more responsible than government cash transfers for reducing inequality in the 
United States.41 
When in-kind benefits (e.g., health insurance, education, child and elder care) and indirect taxes 
(e.g., sales, value-added and property) are taken into account, cross-country differences in 
inequality at the low end of the distribution are reduced. This again points to the importance of 
the definition of income when estimating inequality. Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 
estimated that in the United States cash transfers to those at the bottom of the income distribution 
are comparatively small while in-kind benefits are substantial.42 
Differences between countries’ labor market institutions and policies appear to affect the shape of 
the earnings distribution, particularly for those in the bottom half. It has been suggested that the 
more centralized or coordinated process of wage-setting in several countries (e.g., Germany) 
helps to explain the wage compression toward the bottom of their earnings distributions 
compared with that of the United States.43 This may be due, in part, to higher private sector 
unionization rates in some other industrialized countries and a larger share of their workers being 
affected by union agreements whether or not they are union members. The decrease in union 
density in the United States and United Kingdom between 1973 and 1998 may have accounted 
for 3% of the increase in male wage inequality in the United States and 5% in the United 
Kingdom, for example.44 Comparatively greater union bargaining power (or higher minimum 
wages) also may have caused firms in other countries to pay low skilled workers wage rates 
above their contribution to output.45 This, in turn, may have prompted these foreign companies to 
adopt technologies that raised the productivity of their less skilled employees rather than adopt 
technologies biased in favor of high skilled workers as has occurred in the United States. 
                                                 
40 Timothy M. Smeeding, “U.S. Income Inequality in a Cross-National Perspective: Why Are We So Different?,” in 
James A. Auerbach and Richard S. Belous (ed), The Inequality Paradox: Growth of Income Disparity, National Policy 
Association, Washington, D.C., 2008. 
41 OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, October 2008, 310 pp. 
42 Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy Smeeding, “A Re-examination of Welfare States and Inequality in 
Rich Nations: How In-kind Transfers and Indirect Taxes Change the Story,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, vol. 25, no. 4 (2006), pp. 897-919. 
43 Gottschalk and Smeeding, “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 1997) pp. 633-687. 
44 Winfried Koeniger, Marco Leonardi, and Luca Nunziata, “Labor Market Institutions and Wage Inequality,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 60, no. 3 (April 2007), pp. 340-356. 
45 Daron Acemoglu, “Cross-Country Inequality Trends,” The Economic Journal, vol. 113, no. 485 (February 2003), pp. 
F121-149. 
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Income Mobility in the United States 
To the extent that greater equality in the distribution of income results from policy decisions 
about taxes and transfers, for example, and not from market forces, that equality may have been 
achieved at some cost (e.g., slower economic growth). Assuming the costs are recognized, the 
willingness to incur them may reflect varying degrees of concern across countries about income 
inequality. The results of a study that compared the relationship between individuals’ perceptions 
of their well-being and the extent of inequality in the United States and Europe suggest that 
inequality in the distribution of income is less important to people in the United States due to 
Americans believing that they live in a comparatively mobile society.46 That is to say, Americans 
may be less concerned about inequality in the distribution of income at any given point in time 
partly because of a belief that everyone has an equal opportunity to move up the income ladder. A 
review of the literature suggests that Americans’ perceptions about their likelihood of changing 
position in the income distribution may be exaggerated. 
Intergenerational Mobility 
Intergenerational elasticity (IGE) measures how persistent position in the income distribution is 
from one generation to the next. IGE is a single number that indicates the extent to which parents’ 
position in the income distribution explains their adult children’s relative income. The lower the 
elasticity, the less likely inequality is to be perpetuated from one generation to the next; that is, 
the more mobile the society. 
Empirical analyses have estimated a strong positive relationship—about 0.5—between parent and 
adult child income in the United States.47 An IGE of 0.5 suggests that if the income of a child’s 
parents was 30% higher than the average income of families in the parents’ generation, then the 
child’s income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation. In other words, in the 
United States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage of growing up in a (low) high income family may 
be inherited. 
The Trend in Intergenerational Mobility in the United States 
It is difficult to precisely answer the question of whether the importance of parents’ relative 
income to adult children’s relative income changed over the period that inequality has been 
increasing in the United States. This is partly the case because few sources cover multiple 
generations of adults for which data are available on family income at the time they were 
children. As described more fully below, empirical analyses suggest that children born into low-
income families have not become more likely and may have become less likely to surpass their 
parents’ position at the bottom of the income distribution. Put differently, mobility in the United 
States does not appear to have offset the increase in cross-sectional inequality in recent decades. 
                                                 
46 Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch, “Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans 
Different?,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88 (2004), pp. 2009-2042. 
47 Isabel V. Sawhill, “Trends in Intergenerational Mobility,” in Getting Ahead or Losing Ground: Economic Mobility in 
America, ed. Julia B. Isaacs, Isabel V. Sawhill, and Ron Haskins (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 
112 pp. 
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Lee and Solon used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for children born 
between 1952 and 1975 who reached age 25 between 1977 and 2000 to estimate IGEs. They 
found no major change during the two decades in the influence of parent income on adult sons’ 
incomes. The IGE in each year was estimated to be within 0.1 percentage point of the 0.44 
average over the 1980s and 1990s.48 Hertz, who also relied on the PSID but used a variety of 
estimation methods, similarly found no substantial change in mobility among cohorts of male and 
female children born between 1952 and 1975 when observed as adults starting in the late 1970s.49 
Levine and Mazumder used an entirely different methodology than the aforementioned 
economists whose research also was based on longitudinal data. Levine and Mazumder examined 
the incomes of brothers from two cohorts in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). The older 
group was composed of brothers who entered the labor market during the 1970s; the younger 
group, brothers who entered the labor market between the early 1980s and mid-1990s. They 
estimated that family background, as represented by correlations between sibling incomes, was 
more important to the economic outcomes of the younger cohort (which entered the workforce 
after 1980).50 Specifically, the correlation between brothers’ incomes doubled from 0.21 for the 
older group to 0.42 for the younger group. From this marked increase in the correlation, Levine 
and Mazumder infer that intergenerational mobility decreased substantially at some point 
between 1983 and 1995.51 
Aaronson and Mazumder took yet another approach because they used decennial census data 
which, although it allowed them to cover a longer period, does not follow the same individuals 
over time as do the PSID and NLS.52 They estimated that movement between generations from 
one part of the income distribution to another increased over the 1940-1980 period. 
Intergenerational mobility then decreased substantially during the 1980s and appears to have 
remained unchanged during the 1990s. This pattern suggests that the opportunity for children in 
the United States to attain incomes that exceed their parents’ relative incomes was lower after 
1980 compared to the preceding four decades.53 In a more recent article, Mazumder concluded 
that his research with Aaronson “and the studies using the PSID are in broad agreement that 
intergenerational mobility has been roughly flat since 1990.”54 
                                                 
48 Chul-In Lee and Gary Solon, “Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol. 91 (2009), pp. 766-772. 
49 Tom Hertz, “Trends in the Intergenerational Elasticity of Family Income in the United States,” Industrial Relations, 
vol. 46, no. 1 (January 2007), pp. 22-50. 
50 Levine and Mazumder acknowledge that the correlation captures more than family background (e.g., neighborhood 
influence), but estimate that a large majority of the correlation may result from parent income. 
51 David I. Levine and Bhashkar Mazumder, “The Growing Importance of Family: Evidence from Brothers’ Earnings,” 
Industrial Relations, vol. 46, no. 1 (January 2007), p. 7-21. 
52 They created “synthetic families” by linking children’s birth year and residence to the average income of parents in 
the same state in an earlier decennial census. 
53 Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder, “Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States, 1940 to 
2000,” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 43, no. 1 (2008), pp. 139-172. 
54 Bhashkar Mazumder, Is Intergenerational Economic Mobility Lower Now than in the Past?, The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Essays on Issues, Number 297, April 2012, p. 3. 
The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and International Comparisons 
 
Congressional Research Service 16 
Cross-Country Comparisons of Intergenerational Mobility 
Analysts have developed estimates of intergenerational mobility that use differing statistical 
approaches and are based on the longitudinal surveys and administrative records available in each 
country. The cross-country estimates usually are derived from earnings of fathers and their adult 
sons because data on daughters and other sources of income are more limited in countries other 
than the United States. Although the rank of the United States differs somewhat from one study to 
the next, as discussed below, the United States typically is found to be among the least mobile of 
the advanced economies. 
Corak reviewed numerous studies that offered differing estimates of intergenerational income 
persistence for each of several advanced economies. Based on his assessment of the preferred 
IGE for the nations in the meta-analysis, Corak concluded that the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France are the least mobile. In these countries, about 40% to 50% of the economic 
advantage high-earning young men have over lower earners may be due to their coming from 
more affluent families. In the cases of Canada, Finland, Norway, and Denmark, the effect of 
fathers’ on adult sons’ relative earnings was found to be lower at about 20% or less. With IGEs of 
about 30%, mobility in Germany and Sweden falls between these two groups.55 
Jantti et al. developed comparable intergenerational samples for six countries from which they 
derived estimates of intergenerational mobility at different points in the joint distribution of father 
and son earnings. The estimation of transition matrices allowed them to compare mobility rates 
from one quintile to another in the distribution. The researchers found that the United States has 
less upward mobility from the bottom quintile and more low-income persistence than the United 
Kingdom and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) included in their 
analysis. The authors suggest that, despite these results, Americans have been able to maintain the 
perception of living in a mobile society because transition rates of the middle three quintiles are 
similar in the United States and other advanced economies. “In the U.S., such middle class moves 
are associated with fairly substantial changes in real living standards (i.e., measured in actual 
dollars earned) ... [that] are experienced or witnessed by a substantial fraction of the U.S. 
population.”56 
Intragenerational Mobility 
Much the same results are evident when it comes to intragenerational mobility in the United 
States. The likelihood of adults moving from their initial positions in the income distribution has 
decreased or been unchanged in recent decades, according to available empirical analyses. 
Bradbury used data from the PSID to analyze family income mobility for working-age married 
couples over the 1969-2006 period. The various measures of mobility she developed indicate that 
family income mobility declined between 1969 and 2006, and particularly since the 1980s. 
Families, whether they started at the bottom or top of the income distribution, became 
increasingly less likely to move up or down the income ladder during their working lives. 
                                                 
55 Miles Corak, Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country Comparison of Generational 
Earnings Mobility, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), IZA Discussion Paper 1993, Bonn, Germany, March 2006. 
56 Markus Jantti, Knut Roed, and Robin Naylor, et al., American Exceptionalism in a New Light: A Comparison of 
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, Institute for 
the Study of Labor (IZA), IZA Discussion Paper 1938, Bonn, Germany, January 2006, p. 28. 
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Bradbury concluded that “family income mobility has been insufficient to stem increases in 
inequality of long-term income.”57 
Acs and Zimmerman used PSID data to determine the trend in income mobility among 25-44 
year olds between 1989 and 2004. They estimated that intragenerational mobility among young 
adults has been stable since the 1980s. For example, slightly over one-half of 25-44 year olds 
were in the lowest quintile of the income distribution in both the 1984-1994 and 1994-2004 
periods. About one-fourth of those in the bottom quintile moved up to the second quintile in the 
1984-1994 period, the same share also moved up in the following 10-year period. Similarly, in 
both 1984-1994 and 1994-2004, about 10% of those in the bottom quintile were able to move into 
the middle quintile of the income distribution; 7%, to the fourth quintile; and 4%, to the top 
quintile. Mobility rates from the higher quintiles into the bottom quintile also were little changed 
over time: 20%-22% of those in the second quintile were downwardly mobile in the 1984-1994 
and 1994-2004 periods, while 11%-15% of those in the middle quintile fell to the bottom quintile; 
6%-7% from the fourth quintile dropped to the bottom as did 3%-4% from the top quintile. These 
patterns led Acs and Zimmerman to conclude that “in the context of rising income inequality, 
stable mobility rates suggest that the distribution of lifetime income must be growing unequal. 
That is, lifetime or long-term economic inequality is rising.”58 
Auten and Gee used panel data from income tax returns to examine mobility over the past two 
decades among tax units aged 25 and older. They similarly found that mobility was about the 
same in most income quintiles between the 1987-1996 and 1996-2005 periods. Auten and Gee 
also estimated a slight decrease in overall mobility, with 58.3% of individuals changing quintiles 
in 1987-1996 compared to 57.5% in 1996-2005. They found that the entire difference resulted 
from less downward mobility out of the top 20%.59 
Diaz-Gimenez et al. used PSID data to analyze household income mobility between the 1989-
1994 (five-year) and 2001-2007 (six-year) periods. They estimated that income mobility was little 
changed, but the six-year span of the more recent period suggested a decrease in mobility.60 Diaz-
Gimenez et al. also found less income mobility among households at the bottom and top of the 
income distribution compared to households in the middle three quintiles. As suggested above by 
Jantti with regard to cross-country intergenerational mobility, the comparatively high 
intragenerational mobility of a majority of U.S. households (the middle 60%) may partly account 
for the seeming misperception among Americans that the United States is a very mobile society. 
Burkhauser and Couch reviewed the limited literature on intragenerational mobility in the United 
States and several other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, and 
Sweden). Their meta-analysis led them to conclude that there does not appear to be a clear 
relationship between the extent of income inequality and intragenerational income mobility. In 
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addition, most of the studies found that the majority of cross-sectional (short-term) inequality 
appears to persist over time.61 
Concluding Remarks 
Measures of the distribution of income across U.S. households show a distribution that is 
relatively unequal compared to other developed countries and a distribution that has become more 
so in recent decades as high-income households benefitted disproportionately from economic 
growth. It also appears that going from rags to riches is relatively rare; that is, where one starts in 
the income distribution greatly influences where one ends up. Whether due to skill-biased 
technological change, globalization or other factors, it commonly is thought that the dampened 
income prospects of low- and middle-skill workers and their children relative to those in high-
skilled households are a cause for concern. Some policy measures that may impact the 
distribution of income include those that involve education and training, the tax code, and a 
variety of transfer and spending programs. 
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